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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant State of New Union filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Union seeking 
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980) and under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). 
On June 2, 2011, the district court granted the United States’ 
motion for summary judgment on the Clean Water Act counts 
and denied New Union’s summary judgment motion.  The district 
court’s order is a final decision, and jurisdiction is proper in this 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the State of New Union has standing in its 
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of groundwater within 
the state or in its parens patriae capacity as protector of its 
citizens who have an interest in the groundwater in the state. 
II. Whether Lake Temp is a navigable water as required 
under the Clean Water Act sections 301(a), 404(a), and 502(7) 
when it is not traditionally navigable, it is isolated from any 
navigable-in-fact waters, and it has no substantial impact on 
interstate commerce. 
III. If Lake Temp is a navigable water, whether the Army 
Corps. of Engineers has jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act for the Department of 
Defense’s discharge of slurry, a fill material, into the Lake. 
IV. Whether the Office of Management and Budget’s 
involvement with the permitting decision violated the Clean 
Water Act when the Director is compelled to resolve disputes at 
the request of the Administrator under Executive Order 12,088, 
and whether the ultimate permitting decision was proper under 
the Act. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court for 
the District of New Union granting the United States’ motion for 
summary judgment and denying New Union’s motion for 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5
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summary judgment. R. 10.  The State of New Union petitioned 
the court for review of the issuance of a permit by the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) under section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1987), to the United 
States Department of Defense (DOD) to allow for the discharge of 
a slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp. R. 3. The State of 
Progress intervened as an interested party because the entirety of 
Lake Temp and a majority of the Imhoff Aquifer are located 
within the boundaries of Progress. Id. 
Following discovery, the Secretary of the Army, representing 
the United States, filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 5. 
New Union and Progress both filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. Id.  The district court found that New Union did not 
have standing to challenge the issuance of the section 404 permit, 
that the COE had jurisdiction to issue a section 404 permit, and 
that participation by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) in resolving the dispute between the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the COE did not violate the CWA. 
R. 10-11. 
New Union filed a Notice of Appeal challenging all three 
holdings of the district court. R. 1.  Progress filed a Notice of 
Appeal challenging the district court’s finding that New Union 
did not have standing to challenge the issuance of the section 404 
permit and challenging the district court’s holding that the COE 
had jurisdiction to issue the section 404 permit. Id. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The COE issued a permit to the DOD pursuant to Section 
404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (c), and (e)(1). R. 1.  This 
permit authorized the DOD’s plan to discharge non-explosive 
munitions in the form of slurry to the dry bed of Lake Temp, an 
intermittent, isolated body of water wholly within the state of 
Progress. R. 3-4.  The EPA agreed with and participated in the 
COE’s interpretation of the facts and grant of the permit. R. 9. 
The OMB, through power granted by the executive branch under 
Executive Order 12,088, resolved an issue between the EPA and 
the COE.  After the resolution, the EPA made no effort to veto the 
COE’s permit. R. 10. 
3
  
2012] BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE 105 
 
The proposed process will raise the lakebed several feet, 
which will extend the lake’s water elevation six feet and surface 
area by two square miles. R. 4.  Currently, twenty-seven square 
miles is the largest the lake gets during the rainy season. R. 3-4. 
It is much smaller during dry years, and one out of five years it is 
wholly dry. R. 4.  Surface water flows into the lake from a 
watershed of surrounding mountains located primarily in 
Progress. Id.  The DOD’s plan includes continually grading the 
lakebed edges so that this runoff will be unimpeded. Id. 
Ultimately, the runoff’s alluvial deposits will re-cover the lakebed 
and, although at a higher elevation, it will essentially return it to 
its present ecological condition. R. 4-5. 
Along both sides of a Progress state highway adjacent to, and 
about one hundred feet away from, the lake, the DOD posted no 
trespassing and danger signs. R. 4.  Despite the signs, over the 
last century, it is conjectured that a yearly average of about ten 
hunters, a majority of whom are residents of Progress, use the 
lake to hunt migratory ducks. R. 4. 
There is an aquifer one thousand feet below Lake Temp and 
five percent of it is located in New Union. R. 4.  One of New 
Union’s citizens, Dale Bompers, owns, operates, and resides on a 
ranch in New Union above the aquifer. R. 4, 6.  Currently the 
aquifer is not potable or usable in agriculture without treatment 
due to a high level of sulfur. Id.  A New Union statute requires 
citizens to acquire a permit to use the groundwater as a means of 
regulating withdrawals and for water conservation. R. 6.  There is 
no evidence presented on the timing and severity of the 
pollution’s impact on the portion of the aquifer beneath New 
Union. R. 5-6.  Installing and operating wells could collect this 
data, but the DOD admits that they will not grant access for non-
military purposes; thus, New Union never filed a permit with the 
DOD for installation. R. 6.  At this point, the wells would not 
yield any conclusive data until after the activity is underway. R. 
6. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court rendered summary judgment in Defendant 
United States’ favor.  This Court reviews district court decisions 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5
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granting summary judgment de novo. PCI Transp. Inc. v. Fort 
Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 2005).  The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the review of agency 
decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966).  The Act grants federal 
courts the authority to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency 
actions that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State of New Union establishes standing both in its 
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of groundwater within 
its boundaries and in its parens patriae capacity to protect the 
interests of its citizens.  New Union’s standing in sovereign 
capacity is achieved through seeking adjudication of a dispute 
over water rights within the State’s borders.  New Union’s 
procedural right to seek judicial review through the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) subjects a state to a relaxed 
standing test.  New Union has a reasonable fear it will suffer 
injury through the contamination of its groundwater—precisely 
the type of injury that the CWA seeks to prevent. 
New Union establishes parens patriae standing because the 
State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the groundwater 
within its boundaries is separate from any interests of private 
parties.  Also, the State’s interests in protecting the physical and 
economic well-being of their residents as well as their rightful 
role in the federal system are both quasi-sovereign interests. 
There is reasonable fear that Dale Bompers, a resident of New 
Union, will suffer injury because the dumping of slurry into Lake 
Temp could percolate into the aquifer and affect the groundwater. 
This potential contamination could reach a sufficient segment of 
the population to establish parens patriae standing.  This is 
clearly an issue that New Union, if it were able to, would seek to 
prevent through its sovereign lawmaking ability.  Furthermore, 
private individuals are unlikely to obtain satisfactory relief 
through lawsuits.  These elements solidify New Union’s parens 
patriae standing. 
Regardless of New Union’s standing, the state is unable to 
contest the permit because Lake Temp is not navigable as 
5
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required under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) (1995), 1344(a), and 1362(7) 
(2008), thus there is no need for any CWA permit.  Navigability 
was written into the statute with a dual purpose: to focus the 
efforts of raising water quality on connected waters that are most 
likely to affect one another and to be consistent with the 
Constitution by limiting any extensive encroachment on state 
powers.  Lake Temp is not navigable because it does not meet the 
statutory text, the case law interpretations, or the regulatory 
definitions.  Furthermore, an extension of jurisdiction to non-
navigable, isolated, intrastate waters that could potentially affect 
interstate commerce exceeds the CWA’s statutory authority and 
violates the Constitution. 
Given the context in which navigability appears in the CWA 
and the inherent constitutional limitations, the COE’s attempt to 
extend jurisdiction to isolated waters that have a potential effect 
on interstate commerce is unconstitutional.  The chosen statutory 
term, “navigable,” is absent from and incompatible with all of the 
characteristics of Lake Temp.  This leads to the conclusion that 
not only is the interstate commerce regulatory definition not met, 
it is an unconstitutional extension of the COE’s jurisdiction. 
If Lake Temp is within the jurisdiction of the CWA, then the 
DOD’s discharge of slurry into the lake is properly permitted 
under section 404 of the Act.  Section 402 provides that the 
Administrator may permit discharges that are not subject to 
Section 404 of the Act.  Congress delegated authority to permit 
dredge and fill material discharges to the COE in Section 404. 
The DOD’s discharge of slurry is a fill material under the 
regulations of both the EPA and the COE because it has the effect 
of changing the bottom elevation of the water.  Additionally, the 
slurry does not fall within the exception for trash or garbage in 
agencies’ regulations because it is not a physical obstruction that 
would alter the natural hydrology of the lake or cause a physical 
hazard or other environmental effect.  Since the slurry is a fill 
material, the Secretary of the Army properly permitted the 
discharge of it into Lake Temp under Section 404 of the CWA 
Because the COE legally issued the permit, the involvement 
of the Director of the OMB in the dispute between the agencies 
regarding the permitting jurisdiction did not violate the CWA.  
Executive Order 12,088 requires the Director to resolve disputes 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5
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between the agencies at the request of the Administrator and in 
accordance with any applicable laws.  Even though the 
Administrator of the EPA was considering exercising her veto 
authority over the COE permit, she ultimately took no action. 
Decisions not to exercise enforcement authority, such as this, are 
presumptively not reviewable per the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Heckler v. Chaney.  Finally, the jurisdictional decision by the EPA 
and the COE should not be disturbed by this court because it was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the 
APA. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. NEW UNION HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
THE COE’S ISSUANCE OF THE § 404 PERMIT 
THROUGH ITS SOVEREIGN CAPACITY AS 
OWNER AND REGULATOR OF 
GROUNDWATER WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES 
AND THROUGH ITS PARENS PATRIAE 
CAPACITY TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS’ 
INTERESTS. 
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires the 
existence of a case or controversy before an issue can be 
presented to and ruled upon by the judicial system. U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2.  Standing “is an essential and unchanging part of the 
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  A state may 
achieve standing in its proprietary capacity when it suffers a 
direct and concrete injury, in its sovereign capacity when it 
requests resolution of boundary and water rights disputes, and in 
its parens patriae capacity when it attempts to protect “quasi-
sovereign” interests.  Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d 
Cir. 2000).  Since the State of New Union achieves standing in its 
sovereign capacity to adjudicate issues within its boundaries and 
in its parens patriae capacity to protect its citizens’ interests, the 
court below erred in concluding that New Union does not have 
standing.  Within the context of cases concerning the CWA, 
standing may be recognized in any “‘person or persons having an 
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interest which is or may be adversely affected.’”  Friends of the 
Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 396 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (1987)).  New Union will 
be adversely affected as a state because any contamination to the 
Imhoff Aquifer will occur in its boundaries and directly affect its 
citizens.  Further, New Union’s standing is not affected by failing 
to comment or object to the Environmental Impact Statement 
completed by the DOD because failing to raise issues during the 
public comment period does not prevent interested parties from 
judicially raising them later.  Vt. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 247 F. Supp. 2d 495, 515-16 (D. Vt. 
2002) (stating that neither the National Environmental Policy 
Act nor the APA requires issue exhaustion). 
A. New Union has standing in its sovereign capacity as 
owner and regulator of a portion of the Imhoff 
Aquifer under the relaxed standing test used for 
states asserting a procedural right because there is 
a continuous threat of injury through 
contamination and the injury sought to be 
prevented is directly related to agency action. 
Despite the DOD’s ownership of Lake Temp, New Union 
maintains sovereign power to contest any possible harm to it and 
to regulate those things potentially affecting the portion of the 
Imhoff Aquifer within its boundaries.  This case is fit for judicial 
review because there is a conflict between the rights of the United 
States under their § 404 permit and New Union’s sovereign rights 
as owner and regulator of potentially affected groundwater.  
Thus, New Union achieves standing through its request for 
adjudication of the water rights in question.  Cahill, 217 F.3d at 
97.  In People of California v. United States, a factually similar 
case, the Ninth Circuit declared that California maintained its 
sovereign water rights over water flowing through a parcel of 
land even though it was ceded to the United States for military 
necessity because water rights are property rights that are 
connected to the land.  235 F.2d 647, 656 (9th Cir. 1956).  Thus, 
New Union has a right to the groundwater within its boundaries 
as owner and regulator of the land above that groundwater. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5
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In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the United States Supreme 
Court set out the minimum requirements needed to achieve 
standing by an owner of affected property.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
560-61.  The plaintiff must show a “concrete and particularized” 
injury-in-fact that is “actual or imminent.”  Id. at 560.  The injury 
must be caused by the actions of the defendant and it must be 
likely that a favorable decision will remedy the asserted injury. 
Id. at 560-61.  However, when asserting a guaranteed procedural 
right, a state may achieve standing through a lesser showing. 
1. New Union meets the requirements of the 
relaxed standing test used for states asserting a 
special interest in a procedural right 
guaranteed to them by the APA. 
Congress authorized, through the APA, a procedural right in 
any party to seek judicial review of any agency decision or action 
that adversely affects that party.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).  This 
procedural right to judicial review allows New Union to obtain 
standing without strictly adhering to the usual redressability and 
immediacy standards.  Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 
F.3d 309, 337 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572). 
The requirements for states afforded a procedural right to 
achieve standing were loosened further by the Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that a “litigant has standing if 
there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the 
injury-causing party to reconsider the decisions that allegedly 
harmed the litigant.”  549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).  New Union’s 
requested relief for the issuance of a section 402 permit instead of 
the issued section 404 permit will certainly cause the COE and 
the EPA to reconsider its decision that led to the fear of 
contamination of groundwater. 
2. The reasonable fear of contamination to New 
Union’s groundwater through surface pollution 
is an established injury-in-fact. 
A demonstration of environmental harm is not necessary to 
establish an injury-in-fact.  Gaston, 629 F.3d at 394 (citing 
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 
9
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(2000)).  All that is required is an assertion of a reasonable fear 
and a concern that the injury-producing party’s actions may affect 
the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land.  Id.  Fear that the 
further contamination of the aquifer would lead to a decreased 
utility of the groundwater, as it may no longer be usable even 
after chemical treatment, is reasonable, and therefore deserving 
of judicial review. 
Contamination of an aquifer by percolation of pollutants 
through the ground is a recognized injury, making the fear of this 
contamination reasonable.  Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp 976 
(D. Kan. 1984).  In Cudahy, the plaintiffs presented results 
provided from monitoring wells that demonstrated the 
contamination of the groundwater.  Id. at 984.  While monitoring 
wells have not been installed in Lake Temp or the aquifer to 
determine the level of contamination, in Cudahy the court 
determined that the impact from some of the pollutants seeping 
down into the groundwater through surface spills was sufficient 
to cause a reasonable fear and concern.  Id.  This shows that it is 
reasonable to believe that pollutants introduced to the ecosystem 
at the surface of the ground can eventually filter down to 
groundwater causing injury through contamination. 
It is not necessary to prove the chemical content of the 
affected water or to even prove that there was “other negative 
change in the ecosystem of the water” to establish an injury-in-
fact.  Gaston, 629 F.3d at 394.  The Fourth Circuit further 
elaborated that actual harm is unnecessary to establish standing 
and found that a plaintiff must show only that “a direct nexus 
existed between the plaintiffs and the ‘area of environmental 
impairment.’”  Id. at 395.  The direct nexus in this case exists 
between New Union’s ownership of the groundwater within its 
boundaries and the threat of contamination of that water by the 
United States. 
The district court recognized, and the DOD does not dispute, 
that if New Union attempted to obtain a permit to install 
monitoring wells in Lake Temp, the DOD would not have granted 
access to complete installation.  Even if the wells were installed 
immediately, conclusive results from the wells would not be 
available until after the dumping of the fill material began.  
Regardless of the lack of data, New Union does not need to prove 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5
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the strength or timing of when the pollutants will begin to affect 
the integrity of the water.  Many times, “requiring a plaintiff to 
demonstrate actual environmental harm in order to obtain 
standing would . . . compel the plaintiff to prove more to show 
standing than she would have to prove to succeed on the merits.” 
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
3. New Union’s complaint is directly related to 
agency action and is the type of injury which § 
404 was enacted to prevent. 
Additionally, to establish standing through its sovereign 
capacity, New Union’s complaint must be related to the agency’s 
action under the statute and the injury must fall within the zone 
of interests protected by that statute.  Ky. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. 
Midkiff, 2011 WL 2789086, 14 (E.D. Ky. July 14, 2011) (citing 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, 417 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 
2005)).  The decision by the COE to issue a section 404 permit 
undeniably qualifies as “agency action” under this requirement 
and the fear of aquifer pollution through the discharge of fill 
material into Lake Temp assuredly falls under the general 
interests of the CWA to “restore and maintain [the] chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a) (1987), and also under the specific interests sought to be 
protected by a section 404 permit relating to fill material. 
B. New Union has standing to challenge the permit 
through its parens patriae capacity because there is 
reasonable fear that Dale Bompers, a New Union 
resident, is under a continuous threat of injury 
through the devaluation of his property. 
In order for a state to bring suit in its parens patriae 
capacity, a state must first “articulate an interest apart from the 
interests of particular private parties.”  Snapp v. P. R. ex rel. 
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).  The state must also demonstrate 
a quasi-sovereign interest in either the physical and economic 
well-being of its residents or in its rights and role within the 
federal system.  Id.  Then, the state must claim injury to “a 
11
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sufficiently substantial segment of its population.”  Id.  Finally, 
the state must show that the individuals who are claiming injury 
could not be sufficiently redressed through a private lawsuit. 
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting People by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d 
Cir. 1982)).  New Union asserts a reasonable fear of injury to both 
quasi-sovereign interests and interests separate from involved 
private parties.  Also, the involved private parties will not be able 
to obtain sufficient redressability through lawsuits. 
1. New Union has a quasi-sovereign interest in 
protecting the economic well-being of its citizens as 
well as interests in preserving the integrity of its 
natural resources and its sovereignty, both of 
which are separate from the interests of the 
affected private individuals. 
New Union’s interest in preserving the integrity of its 
groundwater and its sovereign power to regulate waters within 
its boundaries are both separate from those of the involved 
private parties, thus New Union satisfies the threshold 
requirement for parens patriae standing.  These separate 
interests are also quasi-sovereign because New Union has an 
interest in maintaining its role as a state power and also as 
protector of the economic well-being of its residents and the 
natural resources within the state’s boundaries.  A state’s 
protection of the economic well-being of its residents by 
preventing the devaluation of their property is a “classic 
example[] of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest.”  Am. Elec. Power, 
582 F.3d at 338.  Currently, water from the Imhoff Aquifer can 
only be used for agricultural purposes if chemically treated 
beforehand.  Fear that further water contamination will leave the 
aquifer unfit for use even after treatment is reasonable.  While it 
is true that Bompers does not have rights in the groundwater 
until he obtains a withdrawal permit, his fear of the elimination 
of its utility makes obtaining a permit useless and creates a 
sufficient concern for Bompers’ economic well-being.  New Union 
also has a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its 
natural resources.  Id. at 334-35 (recognizing protecting natural 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5
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resources as a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest since the turn 
of the last century). 
2. The aquifer’s contamination is an injury likely to 
be prevented by New Union’s lawmaking power 
that both directly and indirectly reaches a 
sufficient segment of the population. 
There is no bright line rule that specifies an amount or 
proportion of the population that must be negatively affected in 
order for a state to maintain parens patriae standing.  La. ex rel 
Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(evaluating both direct and indirect effects in determining the 
sufficiency of injury).  Courts have consistently held that a good 
indicator of whether or not an injury is sufficient to support 
parens patriae standing is “whether the injury is one that the 
State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its 
sovereign lawmaking powers.”  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. The 
contamination of groundwater within a state’s borders is 
certainly a problem that a state would likely seek to rectify 
through its legislature.  The willingness and likelihood of 
attempting to address this issue through state legislation is 
illustrated by the fact that New Union has gone through the 
process of bringing a lawsuit. 
Here, Bompers and future owners of his land and other land 
above the aquifer in New Union establish sufficient injury 
through fear of aquifer contamination from the discharge of 
slurry into Lake Temp that could render it unusable even after 
treatment and diminish the value of the property.  See P.R. ex rel. 
Quiros v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1981) (including the 
impact on future victims in its consideration of whether a 
substantial segment of the population was injured). 
3. New Union citizens cannot obtain satisfactory 
relief through private lawsuits. 
Bompers and future owners of his land and other lands above 
the aquifer would be unlikely to achieve satisfactory relief 
through a private lawsuit because without a withdrawal permit, 
Bompers currently lacks rights in the groundwater.  The state of 
13
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Connecticut in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. was able to 
achieve standing partly because the court recognized that it 
would be “doubtful that individual plaintiffs filing a private suit 
could achieve complete relief.” 582 F.3d at 338. 
Further, some courts do not require proof of an inability to 
obtain relief through private suit.  Bramkamp, 654 F.2d at 217 
(stating “a state seeking to proceed as parens patriae need not 
demonstrate the inability of private persons to obtain relief if 
parens patriae standing is otherwise indicated.”).  The ability of a 
private citizen to obtain relief through a lawsuit may make 
parens patriae standing less compelling, but this factor should not 
be dispositive of parens patriae standing.  Id.  Moreover, the right 
of a state to defend the interests of its current and future citizens 
affected by the activities in question should not be left to the 
possibility of one individual obtaining private relief.  Id. 
II. LAKE TEMP IS NOT NAVIGABLE UNDER ANY 
EXISTING STANDARD AND THE INTERSTATE 
REGULATORY EXTENSION IS NEITHER 
SATISFIED NOR CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID. 
Despite having standing, the discharge of slurry into Lake 
Temp does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA because the 
lake is not navigable under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a) or 
1362(7).  Since Lake Temp is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
CWA, the court below erred in granting the United States’ motion 
for summary judgment. 
Congress enacted the CWA to raise the nation’s overall water 
quality level to a fishable and swimmable level by regulating 
pollution discharges into surface waters, but the Act did not set 
out to regulate all water quality.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (2), & (3) 
(1987).  One jurisdictional limit is the requirement that the 
regulated waters must be “navigable,” and Lake Temp satisfies 
neither the plain language definition of “navigable waters” under 
the CWA as “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) 
(2008), nor the requirement that non-navigable waters maintain 
a significant nexus to traditionally navigable waters in order to 
be subject to the CWA.  See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715, 759 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
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Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001). 
The statutory text of the CWA does not extend jurisdiction to 
non-navigable waters, so the administrative agencies attempted 
to push the agency’s jurisdiction “to the outer limits of Congress’s 
commerce power.”  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724. They attempted to 
obtain jurisdiction over non-navigable waters by extending the 
original regulatory definition from including waters “capable of 
use by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce,” 33 
CFR § 209.260(e)(1) (1974), to include all intrastate wetlands that 
“could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” 33 C.F.R. § 
328.3(a)(3) (1999).  This expansion does not warrant Chevron 
deference because it surpasses the agencies’ authority granted by 
Congress and exceeds the bounds of constitutional authority.  See 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(explaining that reasonable administrative interpretations are 
normally entitled deference); but see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 
(declining to extend Chevron deference where the administrative 
interpretation exceeds its constitutional grant of authority). 
Even if the revised regulatory interpretation under Rapanos 
is valid, Lake Temp does meet this proposed definition because it 
does not play a substantial role in interstate commerce.  This 
Court should find that Lake Temp is not a navigable water 
because the lake does not meet the statutory, case law, or 
regulatory definition for navigable waters and also because the 
attempted regulatory extension should be invalidated as an 
unconstitutional federal intrusion into areas of state control. 
A. Lake Temp, as an intermittent body of water with 
no outlets, does not meet the statutory or case law 
definitions of navigable waters. 
Lake Temp, a non-navigable body of water with no surface 
connection to any traditionally navigable waters, does not meet 
the statutory definition or case law interpretations.  The CWA 
defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.”  33 
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2008).  The Supreme Court noted in Riverside 
Bayview that while it may be acceptable to forego “traditional 
tests of navigability” and include non-navigable waters connected 
to traditionally navigable waters, the CWA does not support 
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completely abandoning “navigability” altogether.  United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133-34 (1985) 
(noting that the concerns and goals of Congress indicate an intent 
to regulate wetlands “inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of 
the United States”).  The connection to navigable waters is 
necessary because non-navigable, intrastate waters that do not 
substantially affect the waters of the United States are not within 
the purview of regulation by the federal government.  These 
isolated, intrastate waters were not included in the original 
statutory definition because intermittent waters, unconnected to 
traditionally navigable waters, play no substantial role in 
restoring and maintaining the integrity of the nation’s waters. 
The Rapanos decision held that “navigable waters” must be 
“relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.” 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732.  The Court did explain that the 
connection to navigable waters did not exclude those bodies of 
water that dry up in extraordinary circumstances or traditionally 
navigable streams or rivers that dry up seasonally.  Id. at 733 
n.5.  This logically includes waters that would otherwise be 
navigable but experience either an “extraordinary circumstance” 
or a seasonal dry period.  Lake Temp does routinely run 
completely dry, but, unlike the rivers and streams exemplified in 
the exception, it is neither traditionally navigable nor connected 
to a traditionally navigable water. 
Lake Temp further fails the Rapanos concurrence definition 
because the lake has no “significant nexus” to any navigable 
water.  Id. at 759 (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167).  The close Rapanos decision 
leads some lower courts to apply both the plurality and the 
concurrence tests.  United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th 
Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 
2006); see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
(explaining that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case . . . 
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.”); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 
1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the  narrowest grounds 
usually mean the “less far-reaching common ground”).  The 
Rapanos standards announced in the plurality and the 
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concurrence are quite different, and thus the controlling law is 
unclear.  Regardless, Lake Temp is an intermittent, isolated lake, 
which does not meet either definition or a combination of the two. 
Therefore, there is no jurisdiction under the CWA over discharges 
into Lake Temp. 
B. Even if the regulatory definition was an acceptable 
extension, Lake Temp does not qualify because it 
does not affect interstate commerce. 
Courts cannot read “navigable” out of the Act completely by 
allowing the replacement of the statute’s definition with an 
interpretation so far removed from navigability that it allows 
jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, temporary bodies of water 
like Lake Temp.  The interstate commerce regulatory extension 
was intended and previously applied only for regulation of waters 
“inseparably bound” to navigable waters.  See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 
at 167-68; see also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 
311 U.S. 377, 408-10 (1940) (explaining that jurisdiction does not 
include every water from which one molecule might eventually 
find its way into a navigable water).  In SWANCC, the Court 
clarified that jurisdiction under the CWA regulatory power was 
not necessarily broad.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 (noting the use 
of the term “navigable” demonstrated the authority Congress 
envisioned when it enacted the CWA and mandating that courts 
construe this to require some kind of link to traditionally 
navigable waters).  The Supreme Court essentially recognized 
that there has never been, and should never be, federal 
jurisdiction over a water like Lake Temp that was neither 
navigable nor connected to a navigable water. 
The COE and New Union argue that Lake Temp is part of 
the highway of interstate commerce for interstate hunters.  This 
argument is rooted in the power of Congress to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Supreme 
Court limited this power to three areas: (1) channels of interstate 
commerce, (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce or 
persons and things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Lopez v. United 
States, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).  Since Lake Temp is not 
navigable, it cannot be classified as a channel of interstate 
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commerce or be used as an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce.  The only area in which Lake Temp might be 
regulated would be an activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce, but to meet this the impact must be 
substantial.  Id. at 559 (concluding that “the proper test requires 
an analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially 
affects’ interstate commerce”). 
Here, even if there is an effect, it is too minimal to meet this 
requirement.  Even if hundreds of hunters over the past hundred 
years used the lake, of which there is no concrete proof, that is 
only an average of a few hunters a year.  Moreover, the few 
hunters who allegedly use the lake are not legally permitted to do 
so because the lake is on private military property, and there are 
numerous “no trespassing” signs around the perimeter. 
Regardless of the presence or absence of the hunters, New Union 
has not offered any evidence that the hunters have any effect on 
interstate commerce, much less a substantial one.  Because the 
hunters’ use of the lake is not only unsubstantiated, but also 
insufficient to establish a significant effect on interstate 
commerce, Lake Temp, isolated and unconnected from any 
navigable water, does not meet the COE’s regulatory extension. 
C. The COE’s interpretation is unconstitutional 
because it exceeds the authority delegated to it by 
Congress. 
Even if there were a valid argument that the use of Lake 
Temp affects interstate commerce, this extension would intrude 
upon Progress’ sovereignty.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 556-57 (2000).  The regulatory power granted to the COE 
over navigable waters is always balanced against states’ police 
power.  See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73.  Congress did not 
intend to circumvent the states’ control in land and water 
management, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1987), but even without this 
clear congressional intent, courts are still required to read 
statutes to evade constitutional problems.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 
173.  Progress is entitled to preserve their police power and 
maintain their established rights to intrastate waters within 
their boundaries.  Federal agencies should cooperate with states 
in an effort to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in concert 
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with programs for managing water resources.  33 U.S.C.A. § 
1251(g) (1987). 
The commerce power is closely tied to the congressional 
purpose of the CWA to prevent any interference with the water’s 
ability to be used in flow and stream of commerce.  Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 405-07.  Isolated waters like Lake 
Temp do not affect the flow or stream of commerce.  Id. at 406. 
Extending jurisdiction to waters not physically connected to 
navigable waters goes beyond the authority delegated to the 
agencies by Congress.  It grants the COE substantial power over 
a much larger range of land and water than was intended by the 
CWA statute and would raise significant constitutional concerns 
by altering the federal-state balance.  Therefore, the Court should 
find this extension invalid because it violates both the 
Constitution’s delegation of state powers and the congressional 
intent of the act. 
Lake Temp is a larger lake than the waters at issue in 
SWANCC, but the size of a water body does not automatically 
grant jurisdiction.  Even though the waters in SWANCC and 
Lake Temp are not the same size, the two are analogous because 
they both involve isolated wetlands with no connection to 
navigable waters. 
SWANCC and this case are completely reconciled when the 
SWANCC holding is viewed in light of the Court’s reasoning.  The 
Court reiterated that the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not 
unlimited.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549).  The crux of the holding was not the 
size or use of the lake, but rather the constitutional issue of 
maintaining the States’ traditional and primary power over land 
and water use.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.  SWANCC was not 
decided strictly on the facts, but rather it was a decision 
restricting an overly extensive regulatory definition that pushed 
the bounds of the CWA jurisdiction too far. 
III. IF THE COURT FINDS THAT LAKE TEMP IS A 
NAVIGABLE WATER WITHIN THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE CWA, THEN THE § 404 
PERMIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED BY THE COE 
BECAUSE THE DOD’S SLURRY DISCHARGE 
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WAS CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED AS FILL 
MATERIAL. 
If this Court finds that Lake Temp is a navigable water 
within the jurisdiction of the CWA, then any discharge of a 
pollutant into the lake by the DOD must be authorized.  33 
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2008).  The DOD’s plan to spray the munitions 
slurry into the dry area of the lakebed is aptly classified as a 
pollutant discharge.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2008) (including in the 
definition “munitions”).  As such, the slurry must be authorized 
by permit either under section 402 or 404 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 
1311 (1995).  Section 402(a) provides that the Administrator may 
issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant into waters of 
the United States.  33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2008).  Section 404, 
however, provides that the COE, acting through the Secretary of 
the Army, “may issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”  33 
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1987).  The COE properly issued a section 404 
permit for the DOD’s discharge of munitions slurry into the 
lakebed of Lake Temp because the munitions slurry is fill 
material under the CWA and corresponding regulations. 
A. The discharge of slurry is a discharge of “fill 
material” under the CWA because it meets the 
regulatory definition set forth by both the EPA and 
the COE. 
The slurry will replace a portion of Lake Temp’s dry lakebed 
and change the lake’s elevation, thus it is fill material and was 
properly permitted by the COE under section 404 of the CWA.  40 
C.F.R. 232.2 (2008); 33 C.F.R. 323.2 (2008).  In Coeur Ala. Inc. v. 
Se. Ala. Conservation Council, the Supreme Court held that the 
CWA gave authority to the COE, not the EPA, to issue a permit 
for the discharge of mining waste that was slurry.  129 S. Ct. 
2458, 2468 (2009). 
In Coeur, the COE issued a permit to Coeur Alaska, Inc. for 
the discharge of mining waste into a lake in its efforts to reopen a 
gold mine.  Id. at 2463.  The mining waste at issue consisted of a 
mixture of water and crushed rock that was left behind in the 
tanks after the froth flotation process.  Id. at 2464.  Rather than 
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construct a “tailings pond” in which to dispose of this slurry, 
Coeur wished to use a nearby lake to dispose of the slurry and 
planned to deposit four and a half million tons of solid slurry.  Id. 
The effect of this discharge would raise the lakebed fifty feet and 
almost triple the surface area of the lake.  Id. 
This slurry was correctly classified as fill material under the 
agencies’ joint regulatory definitions that “fill material” is 
“material [that] has the effect of [c]hanging the bottom elevation 
of water.”  40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2008).  
Discharges of fill material are properly permitted by the COE 
under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).  The Court also found that the 
issuance of the discharge permit for fill material was appropriate 
because the permit complied with the environmental factors and 
considerations set forth in the EPA’s section 404(b)(1) guidelines. 
40 C.F.R. § 230 (2008).  The COE concluded that the reclamation 
of the lake would result in an increase in wetlands/vegetated 
shallows with a high value for wildlife habitat, despite the fact 
that the immediate effect would be to destroy the lake’s small 
population of fish.  Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2465.  The EPA did not 
exercise its veto authority despite the fact that, in their opinion, 
the slurry discharge into the lake was not the preferable means of 
disposal.  Id.  This determination not to veto the permit was 
further evidence of its appropriateness.  Id. 
In this case, the DOD’s proposed project will receive and 
prepare munitions for discharge into the lake as a non-explosive 
slurry.  The slurry will be distributed evenly over the entire 
lakebed, and the distribution will raise the lake elevation 
approximately six feet.  The surface area of the lake will increase 
by approximately two square miles.  Over time, alluvial deposits 
from runoff from the surrounding watershed will cover the 
lakebed and return it to its pre-operation condition. 
The slurry is properly classified as a fill material because its 
placement into Lake Temp will change the lake’s elevation level. 
40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008).  Like Coeur, the EPA decided not to 
invoke its power to veto the COE’s section 404 permit, and 
implicit in the EPA’s determination is the conclusion that the 
COE’s issuance of a section 404 permit is proper because the 
discharge classification complies with the EPA’s section 404(b)(1) 
guidelines. 
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Fill material is not defined in the CWA, thus the respective 
regulatory interpretations by the Administrator and Secretary of 
the Army concerning fill material warrant deference.  Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).  The 
Court considers the ultimate criterion for determining 
construction of an administrative regulation to be the 
administrative agency’s interpretation, which becomes the 
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.”  Id.  The agencies determined that the 
slurry that the DOD wishes to discharge should be categorized as 
fill material under their regulations.  40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008); 33 
C.F.R. § 323.2 (2008).  Under Seminole Rock, this interpretation 
is controlling because it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulations, which are identical. 325 U.S. at 414.  The 
slurry will have the effect of changing the bottom elevation of the 
lake, as written in the definition, and is properly classified as a 
discharge of fill material. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008); 33 C.F.R. § 
323.2 (2008). 
B. The slurry is not trash or garbage under 33 C.F.R. 
323.3(e). 
The agencies’ regulations provide an exception to fill material 
that may be permitted under section 404 of the CWA.  40 C.F.R. 
232.2 (2008).  Section 232.2 provides that “the term fill material 
does not include trash or garbage.”  Id.  This exception came 
about as a result of a joint rulemaking proceeding in 2002 by the 
COE and the EPA revising the CWA’s regulatory definitions.  67 
Fed. Reg. 31,129-34 (June 10, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
232; 33 C.F.R. pt. 323).  This final rule sought to amend the 
agencies’ regulations so that they would both have the same 
definition of fill material.  Id. at 31,129.  This rule does exclude 
discharges of trash or garbage from permitting under section 404, 
even if those discharges had the effect of raising the bottom 
elevation of a water of the United States.  Id. at 31,134. 
An important distinction must be drawn, however, between 
discharges of trash or garbage and those of waste material—the 
latter being acceptable to permit under section 404, provided that 
they comply with the section 404(b)(1) guidelines.  Id. at 31,133. 
The agencies found that due to the similarity of some discharges 
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of waste to “traditional” fill, a categorical exclusion of all 
discharges of waste would be overly broad.  Id.  Examples given of 
trash or garbage in the rule include debris, junk cars, used tires, 
and appliances.  Id. at 31,134.  The agencies found that the 
discharge of trash or garbage often creates “physical obstructions 
that alter the natural hydrology of waters and may cause physical 
hazards as well as other environmental effects.”  Id.  Conversely, 
the COE’s regulations were amended to add the words 
“placement of fill material for construction or maintenance of any 
liner, berm, or other infrastructure associated with solid waste 
landfills; placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar 
mining-related materials” in the portion dealing with examples of 
discharges of fill material.  67 Fed. Reg. 31,141 (June 10, 2002) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232; 33 C.F.R. pt. 323). 
The discharge at issue here is slurry, which is listed as 
permissible in the COE’s regulations regarding discharges of fill 
material.  33 C.F.R. 323.2(f) (2008).  The DOD’s discharge of 
slurry, while a discharge of waste under the Act, is not a 
discharge of trash or garbage.   In excluding trash or garbage 
from section 404, the agencies were concerned with larger items 
than the slurry that might impede the hydrology of a body of 
water or cause a physical hazard.  67 Fed. Reg. at 31,134.  The 
ground munitions mixed into a slurry do not present such 
concerns.  The mixture will be sprayed evenly over the lakebed, 
which will not affect hydrology or create any physical hazards. 
Thus, the slurry is a permissible fill material under both the 
COE’s and EPA’s regulations.  33 C.F.R. 323.2 (2008); 40 C.F.R. 
232.2 (2008). 
C. Under Coeur, the EPA may not require a § 402 
permit if the COE has the authority to issue a § 404 
permit. 
In Coeur, the Supreme Court held that by specifying in 
section 402 that “[e]xcept as provided in . . . [§404,]” the EPA 
“may . . . issue permit[s] for the discharge of any pollutant,” 
Congress forbid the EPA to issue permits for the discharge of fill 
material falling under the section 404 authority of the COE. 
Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2463. 
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The EPA still regulates the discharge of fill material to a 
certain extent through the promulgation of regulations issued 
pursuant to section 404(b)(1), which govern the environmental 
standards with which the discharge must comply.  33 U.S.C. § 
1344(e)(1) (1987).  Additionally, the Administrator has the 
authority to veto a section 404 permit, after notice and comment, 
if she determines that the discharge “will have an unacceptable 
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and 
fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas.” 
While the COE is not free to regulate discharges of fill 
material without the oversight of the EPA, Congress provided 
that section 402 permits are permissible as long as a section 404 
permit is not required.  Because the slurry at issue in the instant 
case is a fill material subject to a section 404 permit, it cannot 
also be subject to a section 402 permit from the EPA. 
IV. THE OMB’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
PERMITTING DECISION DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE CWA. 
Congress delegated authority to the COE and the EPA to 
administer the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1987), and because the 
permitting jurisdiction of the two does not overlap, disputes 
sometimes arise regarding whether a discharge is subject to a 
section 402 or a 404 permit.  Executive Order 12,088 (EO 12,088) 
was signed in recognition of such disputes in an effort to ensure 
compliance with applicable pollution control standards. Exec. 
Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 17, 1978). 
A. Executive Order 12088 requires the Director of 
Management and Budget to resolve disputes 
between Executive agencies at the Administrator’s 
request and in compliance with any applicable 
pollution control standard. 
EO 12,088 compels each Executive agency to “cooperate with 
the Administrator . . . and State, interstate, and local agencies in 
the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental 
pollution.”  43 Fed. Reg. at 47,707-08.  Section 1-602 of that Order 
provides that it is the Administrator’s duty to resolve conflicts 
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between Executive agencies regarding the applicability of 
pollution control standards, such as permitting under the CWA. 
43 Fed. Reg. at 47,708.   Additionally, Section 1-603 requires the 
Director to seek the Administrator’s technological judgment and 
determination with the regard to the applicability of statutes and 
regulations.  43 Fed. Reg. at 47,708.  In this case, the applicable 
laws are the provisions of the CWA and the corresponding or 
relevant regulations.  Finally, Section 1-605 stresses that 
“nothing in [the] Order, nor any action or inaction under [the] 
Order, shall be construed to revise or modify any applicable 
pollution control standard.”  43 Fed. Reg. at 47,709. 
In addition to the guidance of the Administrator, the 
Director’s resolution of the dispute between the COE and the 
EPA must comport with not only the provisions of the CWA, but 
also any other applicable pollution control standard.  43 Fed. Reg. 
47,709.  The Director of the OMB is not allowed to resolve 
disputes in a way that would conflict with or have the effect of 
revising or modifying any applicable pollution control standard.  
Id.  The OMB’s involvement in the resolution of disputes between 
the EPA and other executive agencies is limited to the extent 
provided for in the Executive Order. 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, it was alleged 
that the OMB overstepped the authority granted to it by 
Executive Order 12,291 and unlawfully interfered with the EPA’s 
promulgation of regulations.  627 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D.C. Cir. 
1986).  That Executive Order requires that executive agencies 
submit all proposed and final rules to the OMB for review prior to 
their publication.  Id.  The Order also provides that the OMB 
must conclude its review within certain specified time periods 
unless it notifies the agency of an extension, and the Order limits 
that extension by authorizing it only to the extent to which 
existing law permits.  Id. at 568.  The regulations at issue were 
permitting standards under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act.  Id. at 567.  The statutory deadline for such 
regulations was no later than March 1, 1985.  Id.  The OMB 
disagreed with the EPA about the regulations, and refused to 
clear the regulations, extending their review far past the 
statutory deadline.  Id. at 568.  The court ultimately found that 
the OMB did not have the authority to use its regulatory review 
25
  
2012] BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE 127 
 
power under the Order to delay the promulgation of the 
regulations beyond the deadline in the statute.  Id. at 571.  The 
court declined to issue injunctive relief against the OMB and 
noted that doing so in that situation was “an unwarranted 
intrusion into discretionary executive consultations.”  Id. 
The record does not describe the instant situation in great 
detail, but mentions that the Director of Management and Budget 
did get involved in resolving whether or not a section 404 permit 
was proper for the DOD’s discharge into Lake Temp.  It can be 
inferred from the Director’s involvement that the Administrator 
requested his assistance with the permitting decision since the 
Administrator considered vetoing the COE’s section 404 permit. 
Additionally, it can be assumed that the resolution was reached 
through the assistance of the Administrator’s technological 
guidance and determination of the applicable statutes and 
regulations. 
Any involvement by the OMB in dispute resolution is limited 
by the constraints provided in EO 12,088, specifically that such 
resolution must comply with any applicable pollution control 
standards, such as the permitting provisions of the CWA and 
their corresponding regulations and guidelines.  43 Fed. Reg. at 
47,709.  As indicated by the title of the Order, Federal 
Compliance With Pollution Control Standards, the purpose of the 
Order was to ensure that executive agencies worked together to 
achieve federal compliance with these standards.  In resolving the 
dispute between the EPA and the COE, the Director was carrying 
out a Presidential Order to “take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  The COE properly issued the 
section 404 permit because the slurry is a “fill material” under 40 
C.F.R. 232.2 and 33 C.F.R. 323.2.  Because the permit was 
properly issued, the OMB’s resolution of the dispute between the 
agencies did not violate the CWA. 
B. The EPA’s decision not to veto the permit is 
presumptively not reviewable under Heckler v. 
Chaney. 
In addition to the OMB’s resolution of the dispute being 
necessary and proper, the EPA’s ultimate decision to not exercise 
their veto authority pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) is 
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presumptively not reviewable under the APA.  Heckler v. Chaney, 
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).  In Chaney, the plaintiffs were prison 
inmates on death row who had petitioned the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for the enforcement of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).  Id. at 823.  The plaintiffs argued that the 
drugs to be used in their lethal injections had not been approved 
under the FDCA, and therefore violated the Act.  Id.  The FDA 
denied their petition and the plaintiffs sought review of that 
denial.  Id.  On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the 
determination not to exercise enforcement authority was 
presumed to not be reviewable.  Id. at 831.  The Court found that 
decisions not to take enforcement actions were generally 
unsuitable for judicial review for a number of reasons, such as the 
balancing of a number of factors particularly within its expertise 
and the similarity to prosecutorial discretion available to the 
Executive Branch.  Id. at 831-32.  The Court noted: 
the agency must not only assess whether a violation has 
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this 
violation or another, . . . whether the particular enforcement 
action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, 
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake 
any action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each 
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The 
agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the 
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 
Id.  This presumption may be rebutted where the substantive 
statute provides guidelines for the agency to follow in its exercise 
of enforcement authority.  Id. at 832-33.  Congress can use these 
guidelines to limit the agency’s discretion in administering the 
statute.  Id. at 834. 
The EPA’s decision not to exercise its veto authority is 
analogous to the FDA’s decision in Chaney not to exercise its 
enforcement authority under the FDCA.  Here, the decision of 
whether or not the EPA would veto the COE’s section 404 permit 
was a wholly discretionary action and presumptively not 
reviewable under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaney or 5 
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2011).  The EPA’s decision not to veto the 
permit is generally unsuitable for review because such a decision 
involves the balancing of factors particularly within the purview 
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of the Administrator.  The Administrator must determine 
whether a veto would best fit the EPA’s overall policies. Because 
section 404 discharges are still subject to EPA regulations, the 
Administrator may determine that the discharge can be properly 
regulated under a section 404 permit.  Additionally, the 
presumption is not rebutted in this instance because, like 
Chaney, there is no law to apply.  Congress did not limit the 
Administrator’s discretion by providing guidelines in the CWA by 
which the Administrator must make a determination of whether 
or not to veto a section 404 permit.  Because there is no law to 
apply in reviewing the Administrator’s decision not to veto the 
permit, the presumption has not been rebutted and the decision is 
not subject to judicial review. 
C. The jurisdictional decision by the EPA and the COE 
regarding the DOD’s permit was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
Even if the Administrator’s decision not to exercise her veto 
authority were subject to judicial review, that review would be 
limited to the arbitrary or capricious standard in section 
706(2)(A) of the APA.  Russo Dev. Corp. v. Thomas, 735 F. Supp. 
631, 635 (D.C. N.J. 1989).  The Supreme Court, in Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, found that arbitrary and 
capricious review is deferential to the agency.  551 U.S. 644, 657 
(2007).  An agency’s decision will not be overturned unless the 
agency relies on “factors which Congress had not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise.”  Id. at 2529-30 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983)).  The court of appeals found that the EPA’s decision in 
Home Builders was arbitrary and capricious because the agency 
relied on inconsistent findings regarding the applicability of 
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.  Id. at 2529.  In 
reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court found that the 
inconsistency to which the court was referring was an instance in 
which the agency simply changed its mind.  Id. at 2530.  The 
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Court explained further that, as long as proper procedures were 
followed, the agency was allowed to change its position regarding 
the applicability and requirements of section 7.  Id. “[T]he fact 
that a preliminary determination by a[n] . . . agency 
representative is later overruled . . . within the agency does not 
render the decision-making process arbitrary and capricious.”  Id. 
Similarly, the Administrator’s ultimate decision not to veto 
the COE’s section 404 permit was not arbitrary or capricious 
simply because the Administrator had considered vetoing the 
permit at one point in time.  In fact, the Administrator was 
compelled to not exercise her veto power because the section 404 
permit was required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Coeur. 
The DOD’s discharge into Lake Temp was of fill material, as the 
slurry would have the effect of raising the bottom elevation of the 
lakebed.  Section 402 of the CWA provides that the Administrator 
may only issue permits for discharges into navigable waters if 
section 404 does not apply.  33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2008) (emphasis 
added).  The Coeur decision reaffirmed this sentiment, by 
determining that the jurisdictional basis for permits did not 
overlap, thus, if a discharge is subject to a section 404 permit, it 
cannot also be subject to a section 402 permit.  Coeur, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2468.  Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that the 
Administrator made a finding that the discharge of slurry into 
Lake Temp would have an adverse effect on municipal water 
supplies, shellfish beds, fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational 
areas.  Because there has been no finding of adverse impact from 
the Administrator, the EPA could not legally veto the section 404 
permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1987).  Thus the EPA’s decision not 
to veto survives this Court’s review because it is proper under the 
applicable statutes, regulations, and cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The State of New Union has standing in both its sovereign 
capacity as owner of water rights within its boundaries and its 
parens patriae capacity to protect its citizens.  However, because 
Lake Temp is not navigable, the CWA is not triggered and 
regardless of New Union’s standing, the State has no ability to 
contest the permit. 
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Alternatively, if the CWA does apply, the current section 404 
permit is applicable and proper because the DOD’s slurry 
discharge is a fill material and the OMB’s involvement was both 
legal and proper. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Progress respectfully 
asks this Court to reverse the decision of the district court 
denying New Union’s standing claim, reverse the finding of 
navigability and determine that Lake Temp is not under the 
CWA’s jurisdiction or, in the alternative, affirm the District 
Court’s determination that the section 404 permit was proper and 
the OMB’s involvement did not violate the CWA. 
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